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                                                Abstract:  
 
This is the first of two papers responding (somewhat belatedly) to ‘recent’ commentary 
on various aspects of hyperplane dependence (HD) by several authors. In this paper I 
focus on the issues of the relations of HD to state reduction and unitary evolution. The 
authors who’s comments I address here are Maudlin and Myrvold. In the second paper of 
this set I focus on HD dynamical variables and localizable properties and measurements 
and address comments of de Koning, Halvorson, Clifton and Wallace. Each paper ends 
with some reflections on the implications of HD for the ontology of Minkowski space-
time. To set the stage for my responses, I begin this paper with some general position 
statements designed to correct what seem to be widespread and erroneous construals of 
some of my views. Two central points are argued for in this first paper. First,                  
dynamical evolution occurs not only within foliations of Minkowski space-time. 
Rather the transition from the physical state of affairs on any one hyperplane to any 
other, whether the hyperplanes intersect or are parallel, is always an instance of  
dynamical evolution between them, generated by some active combination of boost-
like transformations and/or time-like translations and/or state reductions and 
‘reconstructions’. This point gives rise to a generalized conception of a history of 
dynamical evolution, allowing for the use of parameterized families of hyperplanes that 
multiply cover some portions of space-time. Nevertheless, and this is the second central 
point, for any two generalized histories, H and H’, the quantum states for a system 
on all the hyperplanes of H from the asymptotic past up to some hyperplane, h, 
determine the quantum states for the system on all the hyperplanes of H’ from the 
asymptotic past up to any hyperplane, h’, such that h’ lies to the past of all those 
state reduction regions that lie to the future of all hyperplanes of H that are ‘earlier’ 
than h.  Consideration of these results should defuse concerns that have been voiced 
about the coherence and consistency of HD. A position closely related to the second point 
(albeit restricted to the comparison of histories confined to foliations) has already been 
argued for by Myrvold (2002).     
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1. Introduction and general position:  
 
This is the first of two papers in which I try to clarify some of my views on 
Lorentz covariant quantum theory (LCQT) and the role of hyperplane 
dependence (HD) therein. The main body of the discussion is structured 
around a detailed response to ‘recent’ commentary in the literature 
concerning HD, state reduction and localization.  
 
The specific topics addressed in this first paper of the set, in the order in 
which they will arise, are: (§ 1a) general considerations of the status and 
nature of the particles or quanta of quantum field theory (QFT) (here I try to 
shed a reputation for championing the fundamental status of point particles, 
a view I have never held), (§ 2) the causal analysis of statistical correlations 
between state reductions on intersecting hyperplanes (response to Maudlin’s 
1996), (§ 3) the part-whole relations that can hold within composite and/or 
spatially extended quantum systems and the different forms they can take on 
intersecting hyperplanes (response to Maudlin’s 1998), (§ 4) the limiting 
case of hyperplane dependent state vector assignments in the presence of 
composite systems with constituents space-like separated by distances 
greatly in excess of their own space-like dimensions (response to Myrvold’s 
2002) and (§ 5) the concept of ‘becoming’ and dynamical evolution within 
LCQT (response to Myrvold’s 2003). In the last section, 6, I summarize the 
preceding discussion and offer some reflections as to where the preceding 
considerations may be pushing regarding the ontology of the spatio-temporal 
framework.  
 
In the second and somewhat longer paper of this set the topics addressed are,  
(§ 1) the need for HD over ordinary time dependence of dynamical variables 
and states and the relationship between classical and quantum examples of 
HD dynamical variables (responses to anonymous queries), (§ 2) issues of 
frame dependence and frame independence resolved by HD and the 
relationships between localizable properties and localizable measurements 
(response to de Koning’s 2001), (§ 3) the relationship between putative 
localization schemes, the relationship between  local subluminal dynamics 
over a superentangled vacuum and non-local HD superluminal dynamics 
over a product vacuum, the distinction between localizing entities and 
localizing properties of entities and the status of universal microcausality 
and, again, localizable measurements (response to Halvorson’s 2001), (§ 4)  
some of the same issues as in § 3  as well as the non-existence of strictly 
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localizable objects and, consequently, strictly localizable measurements and, 
once again, the status of universal microcausality (response to Halvorson 
and Clifton’s 2002), (§ 5) the relationship of field quanta and fields in QFT 
(response to Wallace 2001) and, (§ 6), some quantitative details on the 
comparison of localization schemes and the non-localizability of field quanta 
via the energy distribution of Newton-Wigner eigenstates. As in the first 
paper I devote the last section, 7, to summarizing conclusions and reflections 
concerning spatio-temporal ontology. 
 
In later sections, when I address specific differences with various authors, I 
will quote extensively from their writings, which seem to me either worthy 
of emphasis or in error, and will respond to the quotes pro or con. In the next 
subsection, 1a, however, because of my perception of a widespread notion 
that I champion the fundamental status of point particles in LCQT (which 
misconception bears on the principal topics of these two papers), I will, 
without attribution of the sources of the misconception, simply deny the 
views which I do not hold and assert the corresponding ones that I do hold. 
 
1a: the status of quantized fields and their particle-like quanta 
 
First, I do not regard the particles of QFT as having any fundamental status. 
Within the framework of traditional QFT it is the fields that have the 
relatively fundamental status, since, among other things, it is only the fields 
that persist. However, for some time now, the fundamental status of QFT 
itself has been suspect, if not altogether abandoned. Even if Superstring 
Theory were not to live up to its current promise, the Effective Field Theory 
(Weinberg 1995, pp. 499, 523-5; 1996, 19.5-8) attitude towards QFT renders 
QFT an essentially phenomenological treatment of the phenomena of high 
energy physics. But even this loss of fundamental status by the fields of QFT 
does not reinvest the particles of QFT with fundamental status. It just 
deprives the particles of any account that is based in fundamentals (modulo 
Superstring Theory). 
 
In fact, I tend to be suspicious of the very concept of 'the fundamental', 
especially in science, but also in philosophy. That's a big topic that I don't 
wish to address here. I will just note that enough history of science has 
passed under the bridge to provide the lesson that anything that seems 
fundamental at some time is not likely to seem so for very long and long 
established useful theories usually have several ways of being formulated in 
terms of different sets of so-called ‘fundamental’ ingredients.  
 4 
 
Second, I do not regard the particles of QFT or high energy physics as being 
point entities, i.e., without space-like extension. None of them! Not even the 
leptons, quarks and gluons that many of my high energy physics colleagues 
(at least those not yet committed to superstrings) commonly refer to as point 
entities. Indeed, since the mid 60's I have given arguments (1965a, b), here 
and there, on behalf of the space-like extension for all massive relativistic 
quantum particles. Nor does my position on this matter have anything to do 
with the Planck length order of magnitude extension that Superstring Theory 
demands for leptons, quarks and gluons. Without going into details, I claim 
that when my high energy colleagues declare leptons, say, as being point-
like, as far as we know, what they mean is that these particles display no 
internal structure in scattering processes. But to infer pointhood from 
structurelessness involves an unwarranted reliance on a classical analogy. 
Some day our theories and our measurements may require us to recognize 
structured extension of leptons, quarks and gluons. For now, however, we 
can already argue for their structureless extension, on the order of, at least, 
their Compton wavelength, or so I would claim, fully aware, of course, that 
this view is not widely shared. 
 
I believe the tendency to assume that a point-like entity is meant, when a 
worker calls a quantum entity a particle, is partly an unfortunate 
psychological consequence of the classical particle concept resisting partial 
transfer into the quantum domain. Paul Teller (1995) has argued for the 
consistent use of the term ‘quanta’ in place of ‘particle’ to avoid this and 
other undesirable tendencies. I have argued (2002) against this use of the 
term ‘quanta’ because of its already poly-semantic employment. But I agree 
with Teller that the term ‘particle’ has proved itself rather troublesome. 
Therefore, I would like to champion – as the generic name of the members of 
the family to which photon, electron, muon, tauon, lepton, gluon, neutron, 
proton, nucleon, pion, kaon, meson, hadron, and yes, - - - quark and 
neutrino, belong as instances or subsets – the term, quanton1. The term is 
not new, having been variously used for roughly the same purposes intended 
here since at least 1988 (Levy-Leblond, 1988; von Baeyer, 1997). In an 
effort to generate familiarity, I will use the term throughout these two 
papers. 
 
So – a major focus of my work over many years – on localization and 
position operators, is not motivated by a concern for the treatment of 
fundamental, point-like particles ('though I often illustrate aspects of that 
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work by considering single quanton quantum states). It is motivated by an 
interest in the problem of providing a manifestly covariant account for the 
position (as a quantum mechanical observable) of anything, in particular any 
localizable property of a physical system, especially localizable properties 
that are common to large classes of physical systems. Such properties 
include the center of energy (CE) or the center of spin (otherwise known as 
the Newton-Wigner (NW) position – suitably generalized to arbitrary 
massive physical systems). All massive systems in LCQT have such position 
observables, not just quantons. For example, any quantized massive Dirac 
field, as a whole, has a CE and an NW position operator as, in ‘most’ states, 
does the quantized Electromagnetic field (Fleming 1966).   
 
 
2. Response to Maudlin (1996) on correlated state reductions on 
intersecting hyperplanes  
 
In my (1996) I responded to Maudlin’s earlier, excellent critique of 
hyperplane dependence, which appeared in his (1994). A major concern of 
Maudlin then was the “radically new ontological conception of the world” 
which hyperplane dependence embodied. Since it seemed to me that he 
regarded this radicality as stemming solely from the need to handle quantum 
measurement, or state reduction, in a Lorentz covariant manner, I stressed 
the fact that in purely deterministic, unitary evolution of composite quantum 
systems, precisely analogous hyperplane dependence would be seen in the 
various subsystem mixed states as a dynamical consequence of the evolving 
correlations between the subsystems. I then added, and will repeat here for 
emphasis (1996, p.19), “In this way we see that the hyperplane dependence 
of state vector assignments in the presence of state reduction is a 
consequence, required by consistency considerations, of hyperplane 
dependent correlations between microsystems and macrosystems established 
via unitary evolution in the absence of state reduction.” 
 
I also tried to assuage Maudlin’s concern over the assignment, in the 
presence of state reductions, of distinct polarization states to a single 
quanton on intersecting hyperplanes, the intersection of which overlapped 
the localization region of the quanton within those hyperplanes. But my 
comments, in that response, on the existence of many HD observables, 
including polarization, were incomplete. I return to this matter in §§ 3,     
(pp. 13-15), and 4, (p. 20), with a, hopefully, more adequate account. 
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In his (1996) Maudlin resumed commentary on hyperplane dependence and 
I now offer this severely belated response. This time, I think, Maudlin’s 
characteristically penetrating observations are accompanied by a genuine 
misunderstanding of one aspect of hyperplane dependence and my 
comments will focus on correcting this. 
 
Not unreasonably, following my (1996) comments, Maudlin (1996) 
challenges me to take state reduction seriously (p.299): “If Fleming thinks 
that collapses are objectively real, then he must take the collapse dynamics 
seriously, and see how the hyperplanes play a role there. And here there is, I 
think, a deep and difficult puzzle.” Maudlin then considers the standard 
EPR-Bohm-Bell arrangement for two entangled electrons initially in the 
singlet spin state but with slightly misaligned polarization detectors to 
intercept the two electrons, (Fig. 1). The singlet spin state, 
 
   |Ψ0 > = (2)-1/2 { |e L, ↑L >|e R, ↓L >  –  |e L, ↓L >|e R, ↑L > } 
 
            = (2)-1/2 { |e L, ↑R >|e R, ↓R >  –  |e L, ↓R >|e R, ↑R > },            (2.1) 
 
holds on both hyperplanes, a and α, where the designations ↑L - - - ↓R refer 
to spin states along the directions defined by the slightly misaligned left (L) 
and right (R) detectors. Similarly, if the state reductions at L and R yield the 
results ↑L and ↓R, respectively, then the state vector, 
 
                            |Ψf > =  |e L, ↑L >|e R, ↓R >,                                       (2.2) 
 
holds on both hyperplanes, c and γ. 
 
Accepting the standard explanations of the correlations between the a – b  
and b – c collapses, on one hand, and between the α – β and β – γ collapses, 
on the other, Maudlin asserts, 
 
 - - - there is still an unexplained correlation. The a – b collapse is correlated not only 
with the b – c collapse, but also with the α – β collapse. That is, when the a – b collapse 
yields a down result on the R electron, 99% of the time the α – β collapse yields an up 
result on the L electron. What could possibly explain this ?(p.301) 
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In this example the singlet state vector, 
 
 
 
     Fig. 1: EPR state reductions and hyperplane dependent state assignments 
 
(1) In the Heisenberg picture the two-electron state must be the same on hyperplanes a and α since 
they are connected by unitary boost-like evolution. 
 
(2) The hyperplane evolution from a to b includes the R state reduction changing the singlet state on 
a into a product state on b, say |e L, ↑R >|e R, ↓R >. 
 
(3) The hyperplane evolution from α to β includes the L state reduction changing the singlet state on 
α into a product state on β, say |e L, ↑L >|e R, ↓L >. 
 
(4) The b Æ c evolution including the L state reduction and the β Æ γ evolution including the R state 
reduction must yield the same Heisenberg picture state on c and γ since the physical states of affairs 
on c and γ are connected by unitary boost-like evolution and so both hyperplanes carry the same 
Heisenberg picture state vector. 
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He then goes on to question the adequacy of answering his query, as I might 
do, by insisting that for “consistency considerations” the result of the α – β 
collapse must be the same as the result of the b – c collapse since both 
collapses represent one and the same measurement event. As he puts it 
(p.301), “But the problem is to understand what, given the ontology of the 
theory, this last remark could possibly mean.” 
 
Maudlin’s comments concerning “the ontology of the theory”, however, 
indicate a misunderstanding of some of the dynamical aspects. Maudlin is 
exactly correct when he characterizes the move to hyperplane dependence as 
(p. 299), “ - - - enfranchis[ing] all the foliations, embracing a radical 
democracy, and thereby demanding no new spatio-temporal structure.” But 
it appears that Maudlin sees the dynamics holding within each foliation as 
somehow independent of all the others.  
 
Fleming must therefore accept a dynamics for each  family of hyperplanes which uses 
that family to play the role of absolute time in the non-relativistic dynamics.(p.299) - - - 
These collapses are governed by a dynamics defined on a family of hyperplanes, and 
each family of hyperplanes, it seems, operates essentially as an independent universal 
time for the wave functions associated with them. So how are the collapses in different 
families coordinated?(p. 302) 
 
But, as Myrvold (2002, p.450) has already pointed out, from a somewhat 
different perspective, the dynamics operating within single foliations of 
parallel hyperplanes are not independent. They are tightly correlated, and, I 
would add, in the absence of state reduction that correlation is implemented 
as a unitary dynamical process itself, being generated by the active action of 
the homogeneous Lorentz group generators, always including a contribution 
from the boost generators. Just as a time-like active action of the space-time 
translation generators functions as a Hamiltonian to change the physical 
state of affairs on one hyperplane into that on a distinct parallel hyperplane, 
so a boost-like active action of the homogeneous generators functions as a 
Hamiltonian to change the physical state of affairs on one hyperplane into 
that on a distinct reoriented (and, therefore, intersecting) hyperplane. For the 
general case this dynamical role requires a dependence of the boost 
generators on the presence and nature of interactions which is intimately 
connected with the interaction dependence of the time-like translation 
generators (Fleming 2003).   
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If we now return to Fig. 1 we see that hyperplanes c and γ, both lying to the 
future of both state reductions, each harbor physical states of affairs 
involving two free electrons correlated with two post measurement detectors 
but not entangled with each other. Active, unitary, boost-like evolutions 
takes either of those hyperplanes and their associated physical states of 
affairs into the other. But, being free, the electrons can not have their spin 
states change within that evolution2. Thus consistency requires that both the  
b – c collapse and the α – β collapse yield the same result for the L electron. 
Similarly for the a – b and α – γ collapses for the R electron. There is only 
one L collapse and there is only one R collapse! 
 
To be sure, in this case the unitary evolution from c to γ, or γ to c, does not 
require interaction dependence of the boost-like generators since the 
electrons are free for that evolution. But the general case would not be 
interaction free and arguments of the type employed here could succeed in 
the general case only if the boost-like generators carried the requisite  
interaction dependence, which they do. This issue will come up again in § 4. 
 
Maudlin found the consistency argument wanting because 
 
- - no such consistency is demanded elsewhere. In the region immediately below region 
L, for example, relative to the α – β – γ family, the L electron is still in the singlet state, 
while according to the a – b – c family it is in an up eigenstate for spin in the R 
direction.(p.302) 
 
 But the reason the electrons can be in a singlet state on α and a product state 
on b is that the state reduction at R prevents a unitary evolution from α to b 
or back. Similarly for the different states on a and β. But the unitary 
dynamical connections between a and α or between c and γ are not 
undermined by state reduction and boost-like generators will 
implement those connections.  
 
Another way to emphasize that one does not have distinct reductions for 
each foliation evolving through a state reducing region is by noting that if 
the reduction is implemented in one foliation by applying a projection 
operator3, Π, to the state vector associated with leaves of the foliation 
immediately to the past of the reducing region (a precursor state), then, for 
any other foliation, that same projector, Π, is similarly applied to obtain the 
reduced state (Fleming 1985, pp. 53-60). The reduced states may differ from 
foliation to foliation, but that’s because their precursors already differed to 
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the immediate past of the reducing region. Thus, from the distinct, 
Heisenberg picture, precursor states, |Ψ0 > and |e L, ↑L >|e R, ↓L >  on the 
hyperplanes a and β, respectively, we obtain, from the R region state 
reduction, the distinct reduced states,  
 
                     (2)-1/2 |e L, ↑R >|e R, ↓R >  = ( I x Π↓R ) |Ψ0 > ,                 (2.3a) 
and 
                              |e L, ↑L >|e R, ↓R > <e R, ↓R|e R, ↓L > 
 
                                      = ( I x Π↓R ) |e L, ↑L >|e R, ↓L >,                      (2.3b)  
 
on the hyperplanes b and γ, respectively.                    
 
In more complex instances in which more than two space-like separated 
state reductions are involved, the differences, for a given reduction, between 
reduced states associated with distinct foliations can be correspondingly 
more complex than here. For an example see my (1992). The generality of 
the considerations that have been brought to bear on this example may be 
summed up in the statement that, 
 
the transition from the physical state of affairs on any one hyperplane to 
any other, whether the hyperplanes intersect or are parallel, is always an 
instance of dynamical evolution between them, generated by some active 
combination of boost-like transformations and/or time-like translations 
and/or state reductions and ‘reconstructions’. 
 
The term ‘reconstructions’ refers to the fact that reorienting a hyperplane 
results in ‘half’ of the hyperplane backing into the past of the original 
hyperplane and, possibly, backing through state reductions to the 
reconstruction of  precursor states. Such reconstructions would not be 
calculable if the state reduction operator is not invertible, as in the above 
example. But that practical problem does not interfere with the resolution of 
the correlation problem we are addressing here. Further elaboration of these 
issues will be provided below in § 5 (p. 24). 
 
A last comment on a style difference, between Maudlin and myself, in 
discussing these matters, which may be confusing if not mentioned. 
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I refer to Heisenberg picture state vectors or density operators which, for 
closed systems, never change under unitary evolution, i.e., such objects  
represent (in the absence of state reduction) the relationship of entire 
evolutionary histories to inertial frames of reference. For a given frame of 
reference they change only in the presence of state reduction and then they 
correspond to those portions of entire evolutionary histories lying between 
the state reduction regions. As such they are associated with or are said to 
hold on every hyperplane similarly lying between the same state reduction 
regions. What changes unitarily in the Heisenberg picture from hyperplane 
to hyperplane, between state reduction regions, are the operators 
representing dynamical variables and their corresponding orthonormal 
eigenvector bases. 
 
Maudlin tends to refer to state functions or wave functions. These are inner 
products between Heisenberg picture state vectors and Heisenberg picture 
eigenvectors. State functions almost always change from hyperplane to 
hyperplane, exclusively unitarily in the absence of state reductions, partly 
non-unitarily in their presence. 
 
 
3. Response to Maudlin (1998) on HD part-whole relations in composite 
systems 
 
In Maudlin’s (1998) his concern is with the part-whole relations that can 
occur in the quantum world and the radical difference that emerges there 
compared to the non-quantum world. The most severe differences occur in 
the presence of both Minkowski space-time and state reduction. He 
considers a simpler arrangement than discussed in his (1996) and now the 
focus is not on the correlations between the results on intersecting 
hyperplanes but on the differences that can occur between the results on 
intersecting hyperplanes (Fig. 2). In particular the focus is on (1), the 
apparent need, in order to pin down the quantum state of one quanton (in this  
case an electron) at a space-time point, P, to choose one among the 
hyperplanes that contain P, and (2), the dramatic difference in the quantum  
states that can result from the choice, depending on such things as the 
existence of other quantons and state reducing regions and entanglements, 
etc. 
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                       particle 2                                         particle 1 
 
                                                                                                       h2 
 
                                 
                                                                            measurement 
                                   P                                                   yields z1 spin +  
                             
 
                                                                                                      h1 
 
 
 
 
 
                          |Ψ(h1) > = (1/2)1/2{|z1+ >|z2 – > – |z1 – >|z2+ >} 
 
                              |Ψ(h2) > =  |z1+ >|z2 – > 
 
                
                Fig. 2: Distinct spin states for two quanton system on 
                   hyperplanes, h1 and h2, intersecting ‘at the world line’ 
                   of the unmeasured quanton. 
 
 
The discussion that bears on HD occurs in the second half of Maudlin’s 
article. Summing up some of the results of the preceding discussion he 
writes, 
 
In quantum theory, then, the physical state of a complex whole cannot always be reduced 
to those of its parts, or to those of its parts together with their spatio-temporal relations, 
even when the parts inhabit distinct regions of space.(p.55)- - -  But in the relativistic 
regime there is no unique way of carving up extended spatio-temporal objects into sets of 
interrelated parts.(p.56) 
 
Turning again to the ever popular entangled singlet state of two spin ½ 
quantons, here chosen distinguishable (an electron and a proton, say) for 
simplicity, and with quanton 1 encountering a spin-z measurement in some 
bounded space-time region (Fig. 2), Maudlin assumes a space-like 
separation of their world lines that permits a point, P, on the quanton 2 world 
line that, 
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- - - in one reference frame occurs before [quanton] 1 is measured and in another 
reference frame occurs after [quanton] 1 has been measured. - - - We have already seen 
that we cannot, on any view, capture all there is to say about the physical state of 
[quanton] 2 at point P without regarding it as a part of a larger whole. But which whole? 
Should we take [quanton] 2 at P together with [quanton] 1 before the measurement or 
with [quanton] 1 after the measurement? On any view the choices seem to be 
incompatible.(p.56) 
 
Incompatible, of course, because the first choice leaves quanton 2 with no 
pure (or vector) spin state of its own while the second choice gives quanton 
2 a definite pure spin state of its own, both, presumably, at point P. 
 
Maudlin’s reasoning here crucially employs idealizations which may be 
innocuous if kept in mind, but which, it seems to me, lead astray because 
they are not being kept in mind. The quantons in Fig. 2 are portrayed via 
world lines intersecting hyperplanes at points, and Maudlin is inquiring 
about the state of a quanton at a point intersected by hyperplanes. Outside of 
Bohmian interpretations, however, real quantons do not have world lines or 
quantum states at space-time points at all. Even if, at some time, or on some 
hyperplane, a quanton has some localizable property sharply confined 
within a bounded region, that does not entail that the entire quanton, itself, is 
so confined. Furthermore, for any localizable property represented by a self 
adjoint projection operator, the property confinement immediately disperses, 
apparently partly superluminally (Fleming 1965b, 1985; Hegerfeldt 1974, 
1985, 1998). 
  
To be sure, there is a FAPP level of discourse within which we can often get 
away with talk of the evolution of a quanton as motion within a world tube 
to a good approximation. But even then it is a localizable property of the 
quanton (roughly determined by the detection process we have in mind) 
we’re referring to when we engage in such discourse.    
 
So the world lines of Fig. 2 should, more correctly, be replaced by (probably 
expanding) world tubes and the intersection points with hyperplanes by 
intersection regions (Fig. 3). A real space-like hyperplane intersects a time-
like world tube in a 3-dimensional bounded region and any two intersecting 
hyperplanes have an unbounded 2-dimensional plane as their intersection. 
So the only part of Minkowski space-time that the putative world tube of a 
quanton and two intersecting hyperplanes could have in common is a 
bounded portion of a 2-dimensional plane (Fig. 3). 
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                                4-dimensional, time-like,  
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                Fig. 3: Intersections of hyperplanes and a world tube 
 
 
So, returning to Maudlin’s account, the parts of space-time to which the two 
hyperplane choices attribute distinct states to quanton 2 are not one and the 
same point, P. There is no such point! The parts are, at best, distinct, 
bounded 3-dimensional space-like regions that share, at most, a 2-
dimensional bounded planar region (Fig. 3). While this consideration may 
not eliminate the conceptual novelty completely, it certainly removes some 
of its bite. The distinct states are associated with, at least, distinct 3-
dimensional regions of different hyperplanes and those regions share, at 
most, a 2-dimensional overlap. 
  
Before Maudlin moves on to the consideration of the HD approach to this 
problem he mentions that this is not an instance of purely relational states 
 
 - - familiar from Socrates being tall relative to Cebes and short relative to Theatetus. In 
that cast, Socrates has an unproblematic intrinsic state (his height) and all that changes 
are relational properties. But now the only possible intrinsic property (the spin state) itself 
changes in two wholes.(p.57) 
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I think it apropos here to mention that Socrates intrinsic height changes with 
the spatio-temporal whole characterized by his age. We tacitly understand 
the familiar example to refer to the adult Socrates but that simply means that 
we have quietly and in concert chosen the spatio-temporal whole. And it is a 
whole because Socrates was even less of a point entity than a single quanton 
and he was an open system besides. This dependence on a spatio-temporal 
whole is familiar and that fact has a lot to do with it not bothering us. But 
besides familiarity, the spatio-temporal wholes characterized by Socrates 
different ages do not intersect anywhere near Socrates location within them4. 
That eases the acceptance of the dependence. In the quantum case under 
discussion the spatio-temporal wholes we are considering not only intersect; 
their mutual  intersection extends inside the locations of the quanton world 
tube within them. That is why the dimensional considerations spelled out 
above are important. 
 
If all physical systems have non-zero, 3-dimensional space-like extension, as  
can certainly be argued for within LCQT and QFT (and will be argued for in 
more detail in my (2004), supporting conclusions to the same effect of 
Halvorson and Clifton (2002), albeit for my own idiosyncratic reasons), then 
the additional general considerations which have been brought to bear here 
(beyond those singled out on p. 10) can be stated as,  
 
if any quantum system exists on each of two distinct hyperplanes, whether 
intersecting or parallel, the spatio-temporal regions occupied by the system 
on each of the distinct hyperplanes are always distinct 3-dimensional 
regions sharing, at most, a 2-dimensional intersection.  
 
After mentioning the Bohm approach to this problem, which denies 
relativity at the fundamental level and assumes a preferred frame that 
determines the true simultaneity of wholes, Maudlin characterizes the HD 
approach as one in which, 
 
- - we won’t be able to say anything at all about [quanton] 2 - - - until we further specify 
the remaining parts of some whole. Since the candidate wholes all have parts that exist 
simultaneously in some referance frame, this means that we must specify a simultaneity 
slice through P. This idea, that all the properties of an object are relative to a hyperplane, 
has been championed by Gordon Fleming in his hyperplane dependent formulation of 
quantum mechanics.(p.58) 
 
While I am uncomfortable with Maudlin’s repeated association of 
hyperplane choices with reference frames (see § 5, below, p. 22) and would 
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remove the reference to the point, P, and replace the word “object” by 
‘system’ and the phrase “all the properties” by ‘many of the properties’ 
(since many systems have some properties that are not hyperplane 
dependent), this characterization is correct. 
 
Maudlin then asserts (as in his 1994) that, “- - this radical hyperplane 
dependence is truly new.”, and he downplays my protests to the contrary (in 
my 1996 and lectures that led to my 2000). Presumably thinking of my  
(2000) account of HD in classical relativity he argues, 
 
In relativistic physics, lots of quantities are hyperplane dependent locally, how you 
describe the physical quantities at some point may depend on how you chop up space-
time into slices around that point. But this new hyperplane dependence posits something 
else: how you describe the physical state at a point depends on picking a hyperplane 
through it and  on what goes on arbitrarily far away on that hyperplane.(p.58) 
 
Now I don’t know just what quantities Maudlin has in mind here since he 
doesn’t mention any, but he can’t be referring to the quantities I’ve used as 
examples from classical relativity. My most frequently mentioned 
example is what I’ve called the classical center of energy (CE) position 
variable for an arbitrary system on an arbitrary hyperplane. It is proportional 
to, as its name suggests, the position weighted integral, over the entire 
hyperplane, of an energy-like density constructed from the stress-energy-
momentum field for the system. It’s a covariant analogue of the non-
relativistic center of mass, into which, for material systems, it degenerates as 
the vacuum speed of light goes to infinity. If the system is itself a field, such 
as the EM field, or a space filling fluid, or even a multi-particle system with 
widely dispersed particles, then the location of the CE can, indeed, depend 
on what goes on far away on the hyperplane and can be very different on 
two intersecting hyperplanes, even two hyperplanes with an intersection that 
contains the location of the CE on one of them.  
 
Be that as it may, Maudlin then goes on to indicate a feature of HD that is 
genuinely new in the quantum case, but which he fails to qualify adequately. 
 
- - no amount of information about how things are described on one set of hyperplanes 
(e.g., that the pair of [quantons] is in a singlet state before during and immediately after 
P) can give a clue about how they will be described on another set of hyperplanes - - 
(e.g., that [quanton] 2 has z-spin up).(p.58) 
 
 17 
It is important to emphasize here that the situation Maudlin describes is 
crucially dependent upon the presence of state reduction. But we already 
know that the outcomes of state reduction can be inherently indeterministic 
from non-relativistic quantum mechanics. In the absence of state reducing 
regions lying between the hyperplanes under consideration, then, as 
mentioned in the previous section, the Heisenberg picture physical states 
associated with the hyperplanes are identical and the state functions are 
connected by unitary evolution; if you know the state functions on just one 
such hyperplane and the dynamics of the system, the state functions on the 
other such hyperplanes are determined. 
 
But even in the presence of state reductions, 
 
 if one knows the evolution of the system for one foliation, F, from the distant 
past up to a given hyperplane, h, of that foliation, then the evolution on any 
other foliation, F’, is thereby determined from the distant past up to any 
hyperplane of F’ lying to the past of all state reductions that, themselves, lie 
to the future of h.  
 
This is required by (1), the existence of unitary boost-like and/or time-like 
evolution connecting any two hyperplanes, intersecting or parallel, which lie 
between the same sets of state reducing regions and (2), the implementation 
of the outcome of a given state reduction by the application of the same 
(projection or effect) operator to each precursor state, regardless of 
hyperplane (§ 2, pp.9, 10). 
 
In keeping with my declared view that all instances of physical change from 
any one hyperplane to any other are instances of dynamical evolution, it 
would be desirable to reformulate the italicized paragraph above to remove 
the dependence upon evolution within foliations of hyperplanes. This will be 
done below in § 5 (p. 24). 
 
 
4. Response to Myrvold (2002) on HD as providing varied descriptions 
of objective occurrences. 
 
Unlike Maudlin and most of the authors I consider in the sequel to this paper 
Myrvold is not a critic of HD. While carefully avoiding an assessment of the 
relationship between his perspective on HD and mine, he clearly regards 
instances of HD as necessary in LCQT and not at all in conflict with 
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relativity, pace Einstein on separability. He confines his discussion within an 
approximation or limiting case – the situation in which the constituents of a 
composite system are space-like separated far in excess of their own space-
like dimensions – whereas I am very concerned to go beyond that 
approximation. But within the limits of these conditions Myrvold’s 
treatment is careful and, I think, convincing! I strongly recommend the 
careful reading of his paper. 
 
It is not that I agree with everything Myrvold has written. I do have  
questions and challenges. But even my doubts are directed at matters rather 
clearly put. 
 
Myrvold’s concern is to show that arguments claiming the incompatibility of 
state reduction and relativity theory 
 
- - - do not succeed. Attention to the transformation properties of quantum mechanical 
states undergoing unitary, non-collapse evolution points the way to a treatment of 
collapse evolution consistent with the demands of relativity.(p.436) 
 
He carefully spells out the domain of applicability of the analysis he will 
offer, 
 
 - - - we will concern ourselves with - - - systems that, at least to a high degree of 
approximation, can be regarded as confined to bounded regions of space, and we will 
assume that the systems are confined to regions of space that are large compared to the 
Compton wavelengths of the systems in question but small compared to the distances 
between them. - - - The conclusions of this paper must therefore be regarded as limited to 
the scope of the approximation invoked.(p.438) 
 
He then considers in considerable detail a variety of putative examples of 
state-reduction/relativity conflict taken from the literature, several of them 
initially presented by Aharonov and Albert in the ‘80s. They all involve 
space-like separated state reductions applied to composite, space-like 
extended systems. An intermediate stage in the analysis addresses the need 
to pay proper attention “- - - to the manner in which evolving states of 
spatially extended systems must be transformed.” (p.443). Working with a 
Schroedinger picture (anathema to myself in a Lorentz covariant context5). 
Myrvold reaches an important conclusion with an historical pedigree. 
 
The instantaneous state of an extended quantum system is, therefore, defined only 
relative to a spacelike hyperplane (or, more generally, a spacelike hypersurface) of 
simultaneity. This is not a radically new postulate, but a simple consequence of the notion 
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‘state at a time’ plus the relativity of simultaneity. A state history of an extended system 
is defined only with respect to a choice of a foliation of spacetime into spacelike 
hypersurfaces. This was pointed out by Dirac (1933), and was elaborated by Tomonaga 
(1946) and Schwinger (1948). If one works within the Heisenberg picture, in which it is 
operators corresponding to fields that evolve rather than states, and concerns oneself with 
operators corresponding to local observables, then one need not deal with foliation- 
dependent states (though field quantities defined in terms of spatial integrals of local 
fields are, on such a picture, foliation relative). The language of foliation-relative state 
evolution is the translation of this Heisenberg-picture evolution back into the 
Schroedinger picture.(p.444)  
 
I would protest here that the latter part of this statement neglects the 
evolution of the eigenvectors of observables in the Heisenberg picture, 
which, for extended systems, renders the complete orthonormal bases of 
joint eigenvectors HD, thus resulting in HD state functions , i.e., probability 
amplitudes, which are, as always, picture independent. One can also add (as 
has been discussed in the preceding sections) that in the presence of state 
reductions even the Heisenberg picture state vectors can differ on any two 
hyperplanes separated by such reductions. I would finally add that those 
“field quantities defined in terms of spatial integrals of local fields [which] 
are - - - foliation relative” are, in my judgement, the best approximations to 
what we actually measure in our experiments (this will be discussed further 
in my 2004). 
 
The central conclusions of the paper are contained in the statements: 
 
- - - that with or without collapse, in a relativistic context the state of an extended system 
must be defined along a spacelike hypersurface of simultaneity, and that a state history 
must be defined with respect to a particular foliation of spacetime (p.455). - - - Nature has 
not been profligate with collapse events. There are not different collapse events 
corresponding to different foliations; the accounts given with respect to alternate choices 
of foliation are not descriptions of different events but different descriptions of the same 
events (p.457). - - - A complete state history given with respect to one foliation uniquely 
determines the state history with respect to any foliation - -(p.459). - - - reference frames 
may disagree on which collapse events are chance events and which have predetermined 
outcomes. This is a consequence of the fact that, though collapse events can be regarded 
as local events, the probabilities assigned to the various possible outcomes of this local 
event are calculated with respect to the globally defined state vector, and hence are 
foliation-relative (p.461). - - - Acceptance of collapse occurring as part of a foliation-
relative state evolution entails regarding [our] intuiton, formed, as Maudlin points out, by 
aquaintance with relativity and non-relativistic quantum mechanics, as mistaken (p.461).  
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Within the context of Myrvold’s approximation I am in essential agreement 
with these conclusions. With the exceptions of (1), the characterization of 
the collapse events as “local”, a notion, as Myrvold uses it, with clear 
meaning only within his approximation and (2), the restriction of the concept 
of a history to a foliation (see § 5, p. 22), I would go farther and argue for 
the general validity of the conclusions.  
 
Prior to stipulating his approximation Myrvold distinguishes his position 
from some of my work by, 
 
 - - - not assum[ing] that each detector is associated with a particular foliation of 
spacetime. I will also refrain from invoking observables that exhibit irreducible 
dependence on reference frames or spacelike hyperplanes. - - - A theory, such as 
Fleming’s, that introduces irreducibly extended quantities faces an additional burden of 
reconciling these with the notion that different reference frames merely yield differing 
accounts  of the same processes and events.(p.437). 
 
While I believe it to be consistent for Myrvold to employ these restrictions 
within his paper, it follows from the considerations involved in the earlier 
discussion of Fig. 3, that it is only consistent in the context of his specified 
approximation. Like Maudlin, Myrvold has widely separated quantons on 
world lines intersecting hyperplanes at points and nothing like a dynamical 
interaction between them is permitted within his scheme. But if we allow the 
presence of an EM field, say, in the space-time region pictured in Fig. 3, the 
(charged) quanton within the world tube may very well have a different 4-
momentum, or a different spin (precession), on the two hyperplanes, i.e.,  
 
                                       Pµ(h1) ≠ Pµ(h2)                                                (4.1) 
        and/or 
                                       Sµ(h1) ≠ Sµ(h2)                                                (4.2)   
 
where the symbols may refer to Heisenberg picture operators or, if you 
prefer, to picture independent expectation values. Thus hyperplane 
dependent observables would be required. 
 
 I am also uncertain as to just what Myrvold means by the twice used term, 
“irreducible” in the preceding quote since, at least in the context of local 
QFT, all the HD dynamical variables I have considered have possessed their 
HD by virtue of being integral functionals of local fields over hyperplanes. 
Those functionals are, to be sure, almost always incompatible with the local 
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fields of which they are functionals and so they can not be measured jointly 
with those fields. Perhaps that is the intended meaning of “irreducible” here.  
In any case, even when the observables being measured in collapse events 
are, themselves, HD, that specification is just part of the determination of 
what observable is being measured. It does not modify the way in which 
state assignments are rendered HD in the presence of the collapses. Thus I 
also fail to see the “additional burden” Myrvold refers to. 
 
On the other hand, if one were to accept that all physical systems, without 
exception, were space-like extended systems, as I have claimed above (pp. 
13 - 15), then Myrvold’s path (understanding extended systems by analysis 
into their localized constituents) to his conclusions is inherently approximate 
and not generally applicable. Nevertheless, Myrvold’s conclusions (pp.19, 
20, and as qualified thereafter) are generally applicable. 
 
There are two minor technical lapses in the paper. Fortunately, neither of 
them undermine the general argument. In discussing the Lorentz 
transformation of product states on p.443 Myrvold assumes a product form 
for the unitary transformation operator (eq.17). This would only be correct if 
no interaction existed between the subsystems whose states are represented 
by the factor states in the product. But Myrvold does not make the no 
interaction assumption until two pages later. The reader will recall similar 
comments on interaction dependence of boosts made in the context of my 
responses to Maudlin (p.8). The interaction dependence of Lorentz boosts 
(Fleming 2003) is often forgotten because, I suspect, Galilean boosts are not 
interaction dependent. Furthermore, in Myrvold’s case, one expects a 
passive boost to a new frame of reference not to modify the product 
character of a state. Nor does it. But in the presence of interactions the factor 
spaces corresponding to the subsystems on a given hyperplane change (in 
passive transformations) from frame to frame, just as they do in dynamical 
evolution (active transformations) from hyperplane to hyperplane within a 
given frame. 
 
This lapse plays no havoc with Myrvold’s analysis because his systems do 
not ‘interact’ with each other except through state reduction and 
entanglement. 
 
On p.449 Myrvold suggests that what he calls the relativity of entanglement, 
the presence and/or nature of the entanglement of one system with distant 
other systems varying with hyperplanes intersecting the one system in the 
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‘same’ space-time region, can occur only as a consequence of state 
reduction. In fact such variation can also be brought about via pure unitary 
evolution and Myrvold corrects himself on this point in his (2003)6. 
   
 
5. Response to Myrvold (2003) on relativistic quantum becoming 
 
Myrvold’s (2003) is concerned to refute Albert’s (2000) claim that quantum 
theory is incapable of describing the world as unfolding in Minkowski space-
time. Against this claim, Myrvold offers a specific construction of a concept 
of becoming in Minkowski space-time that is based upon an earlier local 
concept of becoming due to Stein (1991) but which is generalized to 
accommodate space-like extended systems and is, therefore, foliation 
relative, i.e., for foliations of hyperplanes, HD. Although I am not, myself, 
very concerned with whether or not a viable objective concept of becoming 
can be mounted within LCQT, I find myself sympathetic to Myrvold’s 
arguments and constructions, (modulo some concerns about an example 
involving a putative local observable)7. However, as a number of my 
comments above have indicated, I am very concerned to extend the notion of 
histories and dynamical evolution beyond the confinement within foliations, 
and it is at least questionable whether an objective concept of becoming can 
accompany that extension.  
 
On p. 479 there is an important cautionary paragraph arguing a frequently 
ignored point (see the quotes from Maudlin on pp. 13 and 15): 
 
“Choosing a foliation is not the same as picking the perspective of some observer. The 
pedagogy of special relativity, with its tales of observers in trains and on spaceships, can 
lead the unwary to the impression that every observer is accompanied by a foliation 
consisting of hyperplanes orthogonal to the observer’s world line, each of which 
constitutes that observer’s infinitely extended present at some instant, and that accounts 
given with respect to different foliations correspond to the points of view of different 
observers. - - - Nor is anyone under any obligation to refer events to his or her own rest 
frame, and we often do not -------- ”  
 
 This warning should forestall any misconstrual of Myrvold’s foliation 
dependent construction as being observer dependent. Just as well informed 
observers, whether inertial or otherwise, will not disagree as to the physical 
state of affairs on any hyperplane, so they will not disagree on what has 
become relative to what. 
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Myrvold’s extension of Stein’s conception of becoming is expressed by 
declaring that of any two space-time regions, α and β, β is definite as of α 
iff β lies wholly within the causal past of α. Applied to a foliation history, 
every space-like hypersurface in the foliation is definite as of any ‘later’ 
hypersurface within the foliation. For Myrvold this suffices to implement a 
concept of becoming and, in the presence of quantum non-separability, can 
not be improved upon by being made more ‘local’. 
 
But the definition does employ the restricted concept of evolution, or 
history, to foliations, consistent with his practice in the earlier article 
discussed in the preceding section. Outside of foliations some transitions 
between hyperplanes involve ‘half’ of a hyperplane evolving into the ‘past’ 
while the other ‘half’ evolves into the ‘future’. Nevertheless, I would argue 
that choosing any set of hyperplanes parameterized by the real line, such 
that, each point of space-time is included in at least one hyperplane of the 
set and no hyperplane of the set lies wholly within the union of the pasts of 
earlier hyperplanes in the set can be a useful evolutionary path to consider. 
 
I am motivated to assert this addition because I see dynamical evolution 
(especially unitary dynamical evolution) as a more unified process than 
Myrvold or Maudlin. Dynamical evolution does not take place only within 
each of the equivalent possible foliations. It also occurs in the transition 
from a hyperplane of one foliation to a hyperplane of another foliation, i.e., 
from one hyperplane to an intersecting hyperplane. There is only one 
evolution in the HD scheme; that from any hyperplane on which the system 
of interest exists to any other such hyperplane. This point is very closely 
related to the interaction dependence (Fleming 2003) of the boost-like 
Lorentz generators. Unitary dynamical evolution consists of the complex of 
all possible combinations of active time-like translations and boost-like 
transformations. An account of the quantum state of affairs on any set of 
hyperplanes, such as described above in italics, is obviously just as 
informative as an account restricted to a foliation and may be more useful, 
even simpler, perhaps, for analysing particular systems, such as, e.g., 
Unruh’s famous uniformly accelerating detector in the vacuum. If one 
develops the formalism for HD dynamical evolution (Fleming 1966) one 
finds that reorientation and parallel displacement of hyperplanes enter 
equivalently. Indeed, in a recent interesting application of the HD formalism 
(Breuer et al 1998) a natural merging of the two aspects of evolution into 
one has been achieved.    
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This is the appropriate place to fulfill the promise made at the end of § 3, 
and formulate a precise concept of generalized histories (going beyond 
evolution within foliations) and articulate the relationships of mutual 
determination that hold between them in the presence of state reductions. 
 
Accordingly, consider any continuous, invertible map from the real line to 
hyperplanes8, such that (1) every point of Minkowski space-time occurs on 
at least one of the hyperplanes, (2) for any value, s1, of the real variable, the 
hyperplane, h(s1), includes at least some 3-dimensionally open set of points 
that lies to the future of all hyperplanes, h(s), with s < s1. The first condition 
guarantees that all of space-time is covered (at least once) by the 
parametrized set of hyperplanes. The second condition guarantees that the 
parameterization preserves a future orientation throughout and never allows 
“later” hyperplanes to lie wholly in the already covered past. Any such 
parameterized family of hyperplanes defines a generalized evolutionary 
path. Taken in conjunction with the quantum states of a system 
corresponding to the hyperplanes of a generalized evolutionary path, this 
construction defines a generalized history. 
 
The correlation between any two such generalized histories is then given by 
the following: 
 
For any two generalized histories, H and H’, if one knows the quantum 
states  for a system on all the hyperplanes of H from the asymptotic past 
up to h(s1), then one can determine the quantum states for the system on 
all the hyperplanes of H’ from the asymptotic past up to any hyperplane, 
h’(s’), such that h’(s’) lies to the past of all those state reductions that lie 
to the future of all hyperplanes, h(s), with s < s1.  
 
The concept of evolutionary path introduced here allows for the hyperplanes 
within a history to sweep backwards (via reorientation) through a state 
reduction process as the real variable (playing the role of time) moves 
forwards. If such a state reduction is implemented by a projection operator 
then there is no possibility of calculating the precursor state from the state 
produced by the reduction. Thus for calculational purposes it would be 
desirable to have all state reductions implemented by invertible effect 
operators which can, after all, approximate projection operators arbitrarily 
closely. Nevertheless, with projectors or otherwise, there will always exist  
‘earlier’ values of the real variable at which the reduction process in 
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question is being swept over in the future direction and the precursor state is 
accessible in the normal manner.  
 
Does any vestige of Myrvold’s concept of becoming survive the extension to 
generalized histories? Well, at least this much: every hyperplane in a 
generalized history contains some space-time region that is not definite as of 
all ‘earlier’ hyperplanes in the history but which is definite as of some ‘later’ 
hyperplane and is ‘permanently’ definite as of some, possibly other, ‘later’ 
hyperplane in the history. Whether this can satisfy the champions of 
becoming, I do not know.  
 
On p. 482 Myrvold is discussing the relevance of local operations to an 
account of the world unfolding in Minkowski space-time. He assumes the 
standard connection between local operations  and the local observables of 
algebraic QFT. But then, Myrvold selects, as an example of his general 
discussion, the spin observables of a  separated pair of spin ½ quantons in a 
singlet state. But spin is not a local observable! Not the spin of a quanton, 
nor the spin, understood as the internal angular momentum, of any system. It 
matters not how localized the system may be in whatever localization 
scheme one adopts (Localization schemes will also be discussed in my 
2004). To see this, consider a single free quanton with 4-momentum 
observable, Pµ. Let O be a region of space-time within which one hopes to 
find the spin observable, let’s call it Sµ(O), for the quanton, where some 
linear constraint allows only three independent components9. Suppose the 
displacement of the region O by the displacement vector, aµ, is O(a). Then, 
O = O(0), and Sµ(O(a)) would be a suitable spin operator for the 
correspondingly displaced quanton state. Now the 4-momentum, Pµ, is also 
the generator of displacements. So we must have, 
 
                          [Sν(O(a)), Pµ] = iħ ∂Sν(O(a))/∂aµ                                (5.1) 
 
But for a free quanton, spin is conserved and commutes with momentum. So 
our local Sµ(O) cannot be the spin. Nor can the matter be saved by setting, 
∂Sν(O(a))/∂aµ |a = 0  = 0, since that would lead, from (5.1), to, ∂Sν(O(a))/∂aµ    
= 0, for arbitrary a, and thence to, Sν(O) = Sν(O(a)), for arbitrary a. But then, 
for sufficiently large, space-like, a, we would obtain, from microcausality,  
[Sµ(O), Sν(O)] = 0, and again our local observable is not the spin. If one 
argues that we should use a local observable for Pµ as well, one can show 
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that for any O’ that contains O within one of O’s open subsets, we must 
again have, 
 
                          [Sν(O(a)), Pµ(O’)] = iħ ∂Sν(O(a))/∂aµ ,                        (5.2) 
 
for the open set of a’s such that O(a) lies within O’. With slight 
modification, the preceding argument again goes through. 
 
The immediately preceding considerations occurred in Myrvold’s § 3 where 
he is concerned with purely unitary evolution. The remainder of that section 
comprises a very clear set of arguments against Albert’s claim of the 
metaphysical incompatibility of quantum theory and relativity and on behalf 
of the relativity of entanglement. As much of that discussion depends 
critically upon considering curvilinear hypersurfaces within foliation 
histories, it lies outside my primary concerns. I will only comment that if 
Albert defines special relativity tightly enough he can maintain his claim of 
metaphysical incompatibility. In that case Myrvold’s position could be 
summed up by saying that quantum theory is not incompatible, 
metaphysically or otherwise, with Lorentz covariance. And Lorentz 
covariance is the only part of special relativity that counts in quantum 
theory. By all means Lorentz covariance should be subject to empirical test 
as Albert calls for and Myrvold embraces. But if the tests are passed, it is 
only Lorentz covariance that would be supported and not the classical 
accretions that comprise the rest of special relativity. 
 
Myrvold’s § 4 addresses the compatibility issue in the presence of state 
reduction. While I doubt the direct relevance of local observables to that 
which we actually measure (The observable, Ω, and it’s spectral projectors, 
PΩk, which Myrvold considers, would, by Reeh-Schlieder, have non-
vanishing expectation values in every state of bounded energy spectrum, 
including the vacuum, as Myrvold is aware. For more on this, see my 2004), 
within the context of that presumption, Myrvold’s discussion is illuminating 
and insightful. 
 
The rest of the paper defends hypersurface dependent objective chance 
within the context of the usual eigenvalue-eigenvector link and the need for 
hypersurface dependence of position representation state functions. Needless 
to say, I am in agreement with all of this. We differ only in my exclusive 
focus on hyperPLANES, my suspicions about local ‘observables’ and my 
convictions on the non-approximate nature of position representation HD 
 27 
state functions, even for space-like extended quantons within QFT. All these 
matters are addressed at greater length in my 2004. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Reflections on Space-time ontology  
 
In this paper I have, in § 2, presented arguments and explanations which I 
believe should remove Maudlin’s (1996) concerns about the correlations 
between quantum state assignments on intersecting hyperplanes due to state 
reductions. Those correlations are a consequence of the unitary, boost-like 
evolution between intersecting hyperplanes not separated by state reductions 
and the hyperplane independent operator action that produces any given 
state reduction. The unitary evolution is driven by the active application of 
the interaction dependent Lorentz boost-like generators in close analogy to 
the unitary time-like evolution between parallel hyperplanes, also not 
separated by state reductions, driven by the active application of the 
interaction dependent time-like generators (Hamiltonians). The general 
consideration involved is stated with emphasis on p. 10. 
 
In § 3 I have addressed Maudlin’s (1998) concern with the seeming 
incompatibility of overlapping intersections of quanton world tubes and 
distinct hyperplanes supporting distinct properties of the quanton and even 
distinct modes of the properties arising (as regards deterministically or 
indeterministically). I have argued that these matters can be understood  
when sufficient regard is taken of the space-like dimensionality of the 
intersections and of the unity of evolution between hyperplanes, whether 
intersecting or parallel, even in the presence of state reductions. The 
additional general considerations involved are stated with emphasis on pp. 
15, 17.  
 
In § 4 I largely accept Myrvold’s (2002) analysis of HD for extended 
systems with widely separated constituents. Believing that all quantum 
systems are space-like extended, I champion the generality of Myrvold’s 
central conclusions beyond his context while recognizing the need to modify 
his arguments towards those conclusions outside his context. I criticize his 
account of the relationship between the Heisenberg and Schroedinger 
Pictures and his comments on the non-introduction of HD dynamical 
variables. I argue, on the same dimensional grounds raised in § 3, that, had 
he permitted dynamical interactions between the constituents of his systems, 
he would have required HD dynamical variables himself.  
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In § 5 I comment on Myrvold’s 2003 and consider whether his notion of 
foliation dependent becoming can survive my extension of the concept of 
dynamical evolution and histories outside of foliations. The definition of 
generalized histories and the statement of their correlation is given on p. 24. 
I criticize his example of spin as a local observable and express my aversion 
to his reliance on local observables for his analyses. 
 
  
6a: Reflections on the ontology of Minkowski space-time 
 
In a section of the sequel to this paper I argue (criticizing an argument of 
Halvorson and Clifton 2003 for lack of consistency but, nevertheless, 
embracing and extending their conclusions) that no quanton, object, system, 
apparatus or measurement process can be strictly confined within any 
bounded region of any hyperplane on which it exists. If this is correct, then 
 
all physical systems, not just traditionally composite ones, are space-like 
extended systems to which the conclusions discussed here for extended 
systems apply. 
 
Such systems have their physical states and their dynamical evolution, 
unitary or non-unitary, associated with space-like hyperplanes or families of 
hyperplanes (and, presumably, in curved space-times, curvilinear space-like 
hypersurfaces) and not with points of space-time or even (strictly speaking) 
bounded regions of space-time. It is important to realize that by attributing 
space-like extension to all physical systems, the traditional analysis and 
reduction of extended systems in terms of their microscopic constituents is 
no longer feasible in principle; there are, strictly speaking, no microscopic 
constituents. This recognition does not conflict with the FAPP success of 
analysis of ‘large’ systems and processes into ‘small’ constituents or even 
‘pointlike’ constituents. That FAPP success simply ignores the 
comparatively ephemeral space-like tails that all systems and processes 
possess. 
 
This ubiquity of strictly unbounded space-like extension for all physical 
entities and processes, entails that the observables of physical entities are 
predominately strictly assignable only to whole hyperplanes and only FAPP 
assignable to bounded regions, let alone individual points. Even when the 
eigenvalues of the observables identify single points (as in the case of the 
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NW position operators), the points are very much points on hyperplanes, and 
not at all points of Minkowski space-time divorced from the hyperplane to 
which the diagonalized observable belongs. 
 
The glaring exception to this characterization, it would seem, is provided by 
the local fields of QFT. But for these quantities, bounded space-time regions 
and space-time points are not the identified results of localizing efforts but, 
instead, are the a priori labels for the assignment of the putative observables 
of space-time itself; the energy, momentum, stress, charge and current 
densities and the bosonic force fields. Nevertheless, while some HD 
observables of general systems can be defined independently of the local 
fields, the claim for relatively fundamental status of the fields is enhanced by 
the fact that the HD observables are all expressable as functionals, over the 
hyperplanes, of the fields.  But the physical identification of the significance 
of the space-time labels carried by the fields requires returning to the 
measurement of the HD observables of non-field-like physical systems, 
thereby generating an anti-fundamentalist vicious circle that is only FAPP 
defused by the macroscopic, semi-classical nature of the systems in 
question. 
 
When the foregoing considerations are coupled with the holistic HD of state 
vector assignments for extended systems in the presence of state reduction 
(Heisenberg Picture) that we have discussed in this paper (a feature not only 
retained in the proposed dynamical theories of state reduction, but even in 
Decoherence Theory which, ultimately, treats state reduction as an effective 
illusion), the status, within Lorentz covariant quantum theory, of space-like 
hyperplanes (and the points they contain) seems to rival that of Minkowski 
Space-time itself (and the points it contains).  
 
If local QFT could still be regarded as the fundamental underpinning of our 
theories in the Lorentz covariant quantum domain then, notwithstanding the 
fact that extended system observables usually do not commute with local 
observables, one could still make a case that the HD account required to deal 
with the physics of  real systems is essentially derivative upon the 
underlying dynamical structure of local fields over Minkowski space-time.  
  
But local QFT is no longer regarded as capable of providing a fundamental 
account. As mentioned in § 1, the present standpoint, designated by the 
label, Effective Quantum Field Theory (EQFT)(see Weinberg 1995, pp. 499, 
523-5; 1996, 19.4-8), treats the QFT formalism as providing an adjustable 
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scheme for the phenomenological analysis of the microscopic interactions of 
systems of quantons, at least insofar as those interactions can be manifested 
in scattering experiments. In particular, the parameters of the scheme may be 
adjusted to fit the energy scale of the experiments one intends to perform 
and the old constraint of renormalizability is no longer available to limit the 
putative couplings one may invoke for the data fitting. The pro-field 
theoretic, anti-quanton standpoint of workers in QFT in curved space-time of 
not so long ago now rings a bit hollow in the face of the present prosaic role 
of Lorentz covariant QFT.  
 
As I said in § 1a this demotion of the status of local QFT does not elevate 
the status of the quantons that QFT is used to describe. It simply deprives 
them of as ‘fundamental’ an account in terms of local fields as we once 
believed they enjoyed. At present the best prospect for a ‘fundamental’ 
account is offered by Superstring Theory, or, perhaps, M-Theory, whatever 
that might turn out to be. But the jury is still out on that. 
 
Along with the advent of Superstring Theory (see Polchinski 1998), in 
which the basic entities are 1 or higher dimensional extended objects, and 
current research in Quantum Gravity (see Rovelli 1998 and Smolin 2003), 
which seems to be establishing the discrete quantization of volumes and 
surface areas, one may well be suspicious of the future status of the humble 
space-time point in physical theory. Of course, Superstrings and Quantum 
Gravity come into their own at the various Planck scales and one can 
question the wisdom of discussing their development as co-symptomatic 
with the emergence of the EQFT stance, which is applicable at vastly larger 
distance scales and lower energy scales. 
 
Nevertheless, I find myself emboldened by this matrix of developments 
(including the work contributing to the entire discussion of this paper and 
my 2004) to suggest that perhaps, already at the level of LCQT, we may 
more accurately characterize the situation of our systems of interest as one 
of existing in a seven dimensional world of points-on-hyperplanes rather 
than a four dimensional world of points-in-Minkowski space-time. Thus, the 
point, p, with Minkowski coordinates, xµ, on the hyperplane with normal 
vector, ηµ, (all relative to an inertial coordinate system, F), i.e.,            
 
                                             p ~ (η, x)F,                                                 (6.1) 
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is physically not the same point as the point, p’, with the same Minkowski 
coordinates in F, xµ, but on a different hyperplane with normal vector, η’µ, 
p’ ~ (x, η’)F. Within such a conception the points of Minkowski space-time, 
M, are to be understood as equivalence classes of hyperplane points . Thus, 
 
                                          ( pM ∈ M ) Ù 
 
           ( pM : = {p| )} ) x(p))(xxF)(( h   p h  FFF
µµµ =∃∀∧∈→∃ 10.           (6.2) 
 
A question provoked by this conjectured demotion of the status of the space-
time points is why, in a seven dimensional world, a larger symmetry group 
than the inhomogeneous Lorentz group is not operative? Of course, perhaps 
such a group is operative but simply not yet recognized. On the other hand, 
the seven dimensional manifold in question, parameterized in a Minkowski-
like coordinate system (the F in (6.2)) as the set of all ordered pairs of the 
form, (η, x) [with dimensionless 4-component, ηµ, satisfying, ηµηµ = 1, and 
η0  > 0, and 4-component xµ having the dimension of distance], is a 
homogeneous space of the (orthocronous) inhomogeneous Lorentz group, 
i.e., any point of the manifold can be reached from any other point by some 
transformation, (Λ, a), of the group, where, 
 
                              (Λ, a)(η, x) = (Λη, Λx + a).                                    (6.3) 
 
In that sense, at least, there is no need for a larger symmetry group.  
 
Alternatively, we may abandon points altogether as inputs and simply 
construct them as equivalence classes of ‘intersecting’ hyperplanes. 
 
    (p ∈ M) Ù (p : = {h| )} )(h)  x(h))(xF)(( FFFF τ=η∃∀ µµµ 11 .              (6.4) 
 
In such a scheme, while all points are derivative from hyperplanes, the 
Minkowski space-time points are identical with the points ‘on’ hyperplanes. 
This scheme employs only the 4-dimensional set of hyperplanes for the basic 
input, parameterized in a Minkowski-like coordinate system (the F in (6.4)) 
by the ordered pair, (η, τ), and the obvious symmetry group is, once again, 
the (orthocronous) inhomogeneous Lorentz group, where, 
 
                             (Λ, a)(η, τ) = (Λη, τ + aΛη).                                 (6.5) 
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However, as we must ultimately admit dynamical variables assigned to 
ordered pairs of an equivalence class of hyperplanes (a point) and one 
hyperplane from the class, e.g., HD fields such as the NW creation and 
annihilation fields (Fleming 2000, 2004), the effective seven dimensional 
world of the first scheme is not far away. In any case both schemes treat the 
points of Minkowski space-time as equivalence classes of (dare I say it) 
relatively more ‘fundamental’ entities, either points-on-hyperplanes or 
hyperplanes, themselves. It is conjectured that it is those latter entities that 
exist as spatio-temporal supports for more ‘fundamental’ properties and/or 
dynamical variables than those associated with Minkowski space-time 
points. 
 
Further examination of these ideas will be pursued in the last section of the 
sequel to this paper (Fleming 2004). 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1.(from p. 4) To firm up the definition, let’s reserve quanton for any particle-like quanta 
of a quantized field or any bound state of such quanta due to interactions which have, 
themselves, no macroscopic classical field manifestation, i.e., interactions other than 
electromagnetism or gravitation. This would include hadrons and nuclei among quantons 
and would exclude atoms, molecules, planets and stars. 
 
2.(from p. 9) While not incorrect, this statement ignores the great variety of ways to 
describe spin and the varying forms of HD those different descriptions display in LCQT 
(Fleming 1965a, b). 
 
3.(from p. 9) Or an effect operator if the state reduction is not exactly replicable. 
 
4.(from p. 15) The Earth’s spinning and orbital motions around a drifting Sun guarantee 
that the spatio-temporal wholes of Socrates different ages are not quite parallel 
hyperplanes. 
 
5.(from p. 18) In the Heisenberg picture unitary evolution and state reducing evolution 
are cleanly separated between operators and states, respectively, and manifestly covariant 
notation is much simpler to implement. 
 
6.(from p. 22) An instance of Myrvold’s relativity of entanglement induced by unitary 
evolution is described in my (1996), pp 17-19. 
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7.(from p. 22) The relevance of local observables for describing actions we perform or 
quantities we measure is discussed at length in my forthcoming (2004). 
 
8.(from p. 24) In any Minkowski coordinate system, the parameters, (η, τ), identifying 
the hyperplanes are continuous functions of the real variable. 
 
9.(from p. 25) If Sµ(O) is the Pauli-Lubyanski spin operator the constraint is PµSµ(O) = 0. 
If Sµ(O) is the HD generalization of non-relativistic spin, the constraint is ηµSµ(O) = 0, 
where ηµ is the unit, time-like, normal 4-vector for the chosen hyperplane. 
 
10.(from p. 31) Here each coordinate system, F, assigns an ordered pair, (η, x), to each 
hyperplane point, p. See following paragraph. 
 
11.(from p. 31) Here each coordinate system, F, assigns an ordered pair, (η, τ), to each 
hyperplane, h. See following paragraph.  
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